Dispute Settlement Under the Next Generation of Free Trade Agreements by Claussen, Kathleen
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW(DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018 5:40 PM 
 
 
611 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW  
 
VOLUME 46 2018 NUMBER 3 
 
THE NEXT GENERATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 
 
CELEBRATING THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
DEAN RUSK INTERNATIONAL LAW CENTER 
 
 
ARTICLES 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE NEXT GENERATION OF 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Kathleen Claussen* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 612 
II. THE PRESENT GENERATION OF U.S. TRADE AGREEMENTS ........... 613 
III. CONVERGENCE IN NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT ............................. 615 
IV. DIVERGENCE IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ......................................... 620 
V. A WAY FORWARD: SOME TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS ......... 631 
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 634 
  
                                                                                                                   
 *  Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law.  My thanks to the other 
symposium participants, and particularly to Harlan Grant Cohen, Tim Meyer, Greg Shaffer, 
and Mark Wu.  Thanks also to the terrific student editors of the Journal. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018 5:40 PM 
612  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:611 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The present generation of free trade agreements (FTAs) suffers from a 
lack of innovation.  Political and other limitations have created barriers to 
change.  This path dependence, which finds its foundation in repetitive 
language in U.S. agreements and the proliferation of those agreements,1 has 
two primary effects.  First, it is prompting normative convergence in 
international trade law as other states adopt principles repeatedly advanced 
by the United States.  Many of the FTAs negotiated in the last twenty years 
by states around the globe track the U.S. model, at least in certain chapters.  
Ultimately, and perhaps counterintuitively, the opposite may be true, 
however.  Going forward, convergence in norms may have a negative impact 
on the development of international trade law in the next generation because 
it is likely to lead to a disjointed and incoherent regime.   
This Article demonstrates how and why the next generation of FTAs can 
and should adopt greater innovations that will benefit the world’s economies.  
Focusing on the second, detrimental effect of the present path dependence, I 
maintain that it is highly probable that the disparate use of boilerplate 
language in FTAs will create fragmentation among interpretations as the 
United States and other states engage in dispute settlement under those 
various agreements.  For one, boilerplate language could call into question 
the parties’ meeting of the minds on the language.  More important, because 
the agreements do not provide guidance on how or whether to consider 
interpretations of their sibling agreements, it is unclear what weight each 
dispute settlement panel would give to the interpretations of other panels.  
Because no single court or tribunal decides disputes under FTAs, including 
FTAs of a single country, the risk of divergent interpretations of shared terms 
and references drawn from those divergent interpretations is high—or is it?  
This Article examines how various elements of dispute design may dictate 
outcomes in the trade law regime.   
Analyzing the process and structures through which states make 
instruments of international law—here, agreements governing trade and 
regulatory areas ancillary to trade2—is a foundational element of the study of 
international law.  In a system characterized by a lack of a legislative body, 
the “how” of international law-making is of singular importance.  I argue 
that, here, the “how” has extensive troubling ramifications.  In trade, the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
 2 Twenty-first century trade agreements are also characterized by their topical 
expansiveness.  See, e.g., Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global 
Governance, 16 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 209 (2011). 
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influence of the U.S. congressional-executive trade law-making apparatus 
reaches as far as the contours of the entire international trade law regime.  
Given the alarming consequences previewed above, it may be time to rethink 
this system.   
This Article begins by looking at the present generation of FTAs, 
beginning with the United States, and at the puzzling consistency across 
those agreements.  It then turns to FTAs around the world.  I describe the 
legal instruments that govern bilateral and plurilateral trade arrangements.  I 
show that large portions of their text are repeated across diverse trading 
partners and different political leadership in the United States.  The next 
Section looks to the future and predicts unsettling challenges in interpretation 
of these agreements.  The Article then calls for urgent and crucial change.  I 
propose some possible revisions to the trade law-making process that take 
proper account of the international trade regime and maximize the benefits of 
both consistency and innovation.   
II.  THE PRESENT GENERATION OF U.S. TRADE AGREEMENTS  
The roots of the present generation of U.S. FTAs stretch back to the days 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1.0.3  Substantively, 
these agreements have many features in common, irrespective of their 
diverse foreign representation.  Procedurally, nearly all of these agreements 
were negotiated first between the branches of the U.S. government through 
the joint congressional-executive process known as fast track or trade 
promotion authority (TPA).  At the global level, the present generation of 
international trade law instruments is characterized by the proliferation of 
bilateral and regional agreements of like character, enlarged scope, and 
common language.4   
Outside of the growth in the number of topics covered by these 
agreements, one observes considerable consistency in the text of several of 
                                                                                                                   
 3 Jagdish Bhagwati refers to a “second period of regionalism” that coincides with my use 
of “generation.”  JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM 31–47 (2008).  
Sungjoon Cho refers to a wave of “Neo-Regionalism.”  Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World 
Trade, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 39 (2006). 
 4 This development is motivated in no small part by the failure to complete the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rounds and the public backlash that dates back to WTO protests in 
Seattle in 1999.  See, e.g., Gregory Messenger, Anti-Fragmentation Strategies: The Curious 
Case of the EU and World Trade Law, EJIL: TALK (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/ 
anti-fragmentation-strategies-the-curious-case-of-the-eu-and-world-trade-law/ (describing how 
“institutional deadlock at the WTO had led to a number of free trade agreements being 
concluded globally”); Alex Tizon, Monday, Nov. 29, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 5, 1999), http:// 
community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19991205&slug=2999667 (discussing 
the public response to the WTO negotiations occurring in Seattle that week). 
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the chapters that are repeated from agreement to agreement.  Despite some 
new elements to recent agreements, there are large sections where the 
language remains the same as the last trade agreement negotiated by the 
United States and each of the agreements negotiated before that one.  In 
other words, for some chapters, the first template has been the only template.   
In prior and forthcoming work, I attribute this consistency to the 
congressional-executive relationship unique to the United States.5  The 
additional intermediate scrutiny of larger agreements passed under TPA, as it 
has evolved, has led to stagnation.  Today, TPA exacerbates rather than 
ameliorates the politicization of trade agreements.  The prospect for 
improvements and creative additions to agreements still to come is 
significantly tempered by this path dependence. 
In fact, compared with most features of the international legal system, the 
plurilateral trade law system is in the early stages of its evolution.  The 
proliferation of agreements, particularly bilateral and regional agreements is 
not unique to the United States.  The European Union recently concluded 
trade agreement negotiations with Canada, Singapore, and Vietnam to add to 
its twenty-seven agreements in force and is negotiating approximately ten 
additional bilateral or multilateral agreements.6  In the Asia-Pacific region, 
the number of regional and bilateral FTAs has grown exponentially since the 
conclusion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free 
Trade Area of 1992.  At that time, the region counted five such agreements 
in force.7  Today, the number totals 140 with another seventy-nine under 
negotiation or awaiting entry into force.8  The People’s Republic of China is 
negotiating half a dozen bilateral FTAs at present to top off the sixteen 
already in effect.9  India likewise is engaged in at least ten trade agreement 
negotiations.10  The World Trade Organization (WTO) reports 303 
agreements of this sort in force among its members as of March 29, 2018.11 
                                                                                                                   
 5 Claussen, supra note 1; Kathleen Claussen, Trading Spaces: The Changing Role of the 
Executive in U.S. Trade Lawmaking, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 345 (2017). 
 6 The State of EU Trade, EUR. COMM’N (Aug. 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2012/june/tradoc_149622.pdf.  There are twenty-two trade agreements between the EU and 
individual countries, and five multilateral agreements covering multiple countries.  See also 
Five Models for Post-Brexit UK Trade, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/ne 
ws/uk-politics- eu-referendum-36639261.  I have highlighted these statistics also in my 
remarks at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting in April 2017. 
 7 Free Trade Agreements, ASIAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION CTR., Table 1 (2015), https:// 
aric.adb.org/fta. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at Table 6. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures, WTO (2018), https://www.wto.org/eng 
lish/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm (tracking the trade agreements currently in force). 
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These statistics suggest that regional and bilateral FTAs are thriving.12  
Regional and bilateral agreements have eclipsed the WTO in importance.13  
The following Section examines agreements concluded by other states to 
determine whether non-U.S. agreements also exhibit a significant degree of 
consistency or, alternatively, customization.  I then turn to the effect of U.S. 
path dependence on international trade law more generally.   
III.  CONVERGENCE IN NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
A review of trade agreements from select European and Asian states 
suggests that those states’ agreements do not appear to suffer from path 
dependence in the same way U.S. trade law-making suffers.  In today’s 
domain of hundreds of agreements, it is challenging to trace the source of 
each provision; that exercise is beyond the scope of this Article.14  
Commentators have referred to the present generation as a “spaghetti 
bowl”—a mass of regional or bilateral agreements concluded without 
consideration for each other or their implications for investment, potentially 
increasing both costs and regulation, and distorting conditions of competition 
for traders.15  The concern is not only economic, but also legal: the “spaghetti 
bowl” can garble the coherence of the trade law system.16  
Contrary to this perception, this work indicates convergence within the 
current “spaghetti bowl” rather than distortions in legal norms.  Importantly, 
in some cases, European and Asian trade agreements have adopted language 
and chapter ideas from U.S. agreements.  For example, the same labor 
obligations in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) form part of the recently 
concluded Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement 
(CETA).17  There are a number of possibilities as to how these obligations 
both appeared in these respective texts.  Without an inside view into the 
negotiating room, one could argue that perhaps the TPP adopted Canada’s 
suggested language and Canada simply re-used it in its CETA negotiations or 
                                                                                                                   
 12 Bhagwati calls it a “pandemic.”  BHAGWATI, supra note 3, at 15–47. 
 13 See, e.g., John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in THE 
REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (Jeffrey A. Frankel ed., 1998) (TPP was an 
intrinsic part of Obama’s rebalancing strategy). 
 14 I elaborate on this study in forthcoming work.  Kathleen Claussen, Boilerplate Treaties, 
Working Paper (on file with author). 
 15 BHAGWATI, supra note 3, at 61–71. 
 16 Moreover, fragmentation will not be limited to the normative inter-state context but is 
likely to extend to the remedial channels for trade law claims, as well.  Those domestic 
remedies have costs for stakeholders not yet foreseen by the branches that indirectly promote 
their proliferation. 
 17 See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 23.4, Can.-EU, entered into 
provisional force Sept. 21, 2017 [hereinafter CETA]. 
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the same was true in the opposite order.  Consistency across obligations 
should be more efficient for Canada as a result.  Research by political 
scientists Todd Allee and Andrew Lugg indicates otherwise.  They conclude 
from their text-as-data analysis that the United States had a disproportionate 
influence to the other negotiating parties in the TPP, suggesting that this 
language came from the United States and then was re-used in other 
agreements.18  The TPP/CETA language also appears in earlier U.S. 
agreements.  Lending support to international political economy theories, 
Allee and Lugg’s study shows that the United States is setting the standards 
in these agreements and extending its reach even to those agreements to 
which it is not a party.19 
It is not surprising that U.S.-initiated language appears in what I will call 
“third party agreements” concluded by states that already have FTAs with 
the United States.  What is more surprising, however, is the appearance of 
U.S.-initiated language in agreements between states neither of which shares 
an FTA with the United States.  For example, the same labor chapter 
language from TPP appears also in Article 15.10 of the Sustainable 
Development Chapter of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement.20  At the 
time the European Union and Vietnam concluded their agreement, the United 
States did not have a trade agreement with either country and yet the 
language appeared in almost every U.S. agreement in force at the time.  One 
theory is that the European Union and Vietnam may have elected to adopt 
this language with the express purpose of standardizing or harmonizing 
across international trade and labor.  Alternatively, they may have developed 
the same language on their own.  At the time of the agreement’s conclusion, 
the United States was negotiating with Vietnam under the TPP and Europe 
was negotiating the CETA with Canada, so one cannot say conclusively that 
the influence of the U.S. language led the parties to that language, but the 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Todd Allee & Andrew Lugg, Who Wrote the Rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, 
RES. & POL. 2 (2016). 
 19 This study and similar observations lend credence to Susan Strange’s international 
political economy literature of the late 1980s in which she argues that the entity or individual 
that sets the rules maintains the greatest strength and, therefore, the United States remains in a 
position of strength vis-à-vis other states through its control of international institutions.  See 
SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY (1988).  President Obama employed this rhetoric in seeking passage of the TPP 
saying that the United States cannot let China set the rules of the trade world and that TPP 
would prevent that from happening.  Barack Obama, Opinion, President Obama: The TPP 
Would Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), 
https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not- 
china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_st 
ory.html? utm_term=.f464758e89ba. 
 20 The 2009 international trade objectives set by the EU Council reflect the same principles. 
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language appeared first in U.S. agreements before any of the others came on 
the scene.21  A still better example comes from the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement (a less traditional trade agreement) which entered into force in 
May 2014 and includes the same text for labor and environment as the TPP.22  
In general, the influence of the repeated use of the same language in U.S. 
agreements appears to have influenced at least the EU’s trade agreements 
such that the European Union has adopted the same language and now 
incorporates it into its own trade agreements.   
Borrowing language from other legislation or international instruments is 
not a new phenomenon.  Fortunately for legal development, there are no 
plagiarism rules in treaty-making.  Borrowing could have an impact on 
interpretation, however.  In the United States, courts will assume that 
adoption of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction 
carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording.23  Here, 
there is more than “borrowing” at play.  Rather, the proliferation of regional 
and preferential trade agreements has led to a normative cascade in certain 
areas.24   
Taken together, the present generation of trade agreements exhibits signs 
of convergence in respect of shared principles across agreements and across 
geographic areas.25  This convergence has legal resonance with two primary 
effects for the innovation to standardization pathway described in the 
previous Section.  These effects are distinct in their policy and legal 
implications.   
                                                                                                                   
 21 Even the use of the term “agreement” for free trade pacts has proliferated as a result of 
the U.S. influence. 
 22 The same language appears in a number of other agreements around the world including 
the following: EU-Peru/Colombia FTA; EU-Singapore FTA; EU-Korea FTA; Korea-Peru 
FTA; Korea-Turkey FTA; Korea-Australia FTA; Korea-New Zealand FTA; and, Korea-
Colombia FTA.  See, e.g., EUR. COMM’N, Negotiations and Agreements (Apr. 10, 2018), 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/#partly-in-
place. 
 23 Willis v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 307 (1898).  For a more recent 
statement of the rules with respect to Congress re-using language, see Lorillard v. Pons: 
“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute 
and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”  434 U.S. 575, 580 
(1978) (citations omitted). 
 24 On normative cascades, see Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink’s seminal work on 
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998).  
 25 At the global level, however, the same may not be true when considering also the WTO 
regime.  Cho maintains that the current generation faces fragmentation as a result of the 
proliferation of regional agreements apart from the WTO.  Cho, supra note 3, at 42 (“[T]he 
‘spaghetti bowl’ of mushrooming mercantilist blocs under Neo-Regionalism . . . stress the 
global trade by raising new barriers to extra-bloc trade and disassociating a bloc from the rest 
of the world due to its preferential nature.”). 
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The first effect of the normative convergence in U.S. and other trade 
agreements is standard-setting across trade environments.  The adoption of 
labor and environmental standards generally in trade agreements has become 
normal practice across polities.  Most trade agreements now include 
provisions that seek to avoid a race to the bottom in both labor and 
environment. According to the International Labour Organization, as of 
December 2015, seventy-six agreements covering 135 economies include 
labor provisions.  Over eighty percent of agreements that came into force 
since 2013 contain such provisions.26  As discussed above, TPP, CETA and 
other EU agreements all contain labor obligations.  In each agreement, the 
parties are obligated to adopt and maintain labor laws that afford workers 
certain fundamental, internationally recognized labor rights and to effectively 
enforce those laws.27  The fact that these agreements share these provisions 
across their disparate parties has a further modeling effect for states looking 
to borrow from these and others in shaping new trade agreements.  Including 
provisions that powerful states have adopted may also have political capital. 
In sum, trade policy has evolved to incorporate certain terms as a matter of 
course.  
The second effect of convergence toward the U.S. text is the law-creating 
character of the repeated appearance of these provisions.  Trade agreements, 
while not typical law-making treaties,28 contribute to normative development 
in their repetition.  As the International Court of Justice has described in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, certain treaty provisions can be of a 
“norm-creating character” such that they form the basis of a general rule of 
law where certain other criteria are met.29  From a social science perspective, 
Wolfgang Alschner and Dimitriy Skougarevskiy, looking at bilateral 
investment treaties, conclude that developed countries have more coherent 
treaty networks than their developing counterparts, which, together with the 
idea that those countries are both more prolific, lends credence to the 
                                                                                                                   
 26 INT’L LABOUR ORG., ASSESSMENT OF LABOUR PROVISIONS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS 19 (2016). 
 27 The International Labour Organization notes that the “great majority” of trade 
agreements with labor provisions include language like this.  Id. at 2. 
 28 For more on law-making treaties, see Catherine Brohlmann, Law-Making Treaties: Form 
and Function in International Law, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 383 (2005). 
 29 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3 ¶¶ 72–78 
(Feb. 20) (requiring in particular evidence that states that adopted a course of action based on 
the norm felt an obligation to do so).  See also Anthony D’Amato, Manifest Intent and the 
Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules of International Law, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 892, 895 
(1970) (arguing that the North Sea Continental Shelf test is based on intent: “If the treaty 
manifests an intent to have a particular provision create customary law, that manifested intent 
is controlling.”).  
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hypothesis that they contribute more to the development of custom.30  They 
are not just more prolific or more consistent in the language to which they 
agree; rather, they are both.  It is too early to assert a general rule of law from 
the common provisions in trade law, but their repetition constitutes state 
practice and in that sense they add to what may develop as customary law.31 
The facilitation of normative development through standardized language 
also has an important ripple effect for other areas of law, particularly those 
areas like labor and environment that do not benefit from enforceable 
commitments elsewhere.  For example, commitments in trade agreements 
related to fundamental, internationally recognized worker rights in binding 
agreements go a long way toward crystallizing international labor norms.  
Regardless of multiple conventions on labor law, the International Labour 
Organization’s pronouncements on these issues do not have the same 
strength as the statements in binding trade agreements given their status as 
soft law.32  The widespread binding commitments across agreements to a set 
of labor norms contribute to customary international labor law and a shared 
understanding of internationally recognized labor rights.  The multi-
disciplinarity of trade agreements has a reverberating effect in these other 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, The New Gold Standard? Empirically 
Situating the TPP in the Investment Treaty Universe (Ctr. for Trade and Econ. Integration, 
Working Paper N IHEIDCTEI2015-08, 2015).  See also Lauge Poulsen, Bounded Rationality 
and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L STUDS. Q. 1, 2 (2014) (concluding 
that “developing countries often accepted the treaty template offered by their developed 
country treaty partner without meaningful negotiation”).  In contrast with trade agreements, 
the United States has concluded most of its bilateral investment treaties with developing or 
least-developed countries with asymmetric trading relationships with the United States.  
UNITED STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402. 
htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).  Some have characterized the BIT system’s power differential 
as creating “contracts of adhesion” or “consumer protection” models, arguing that investment 
treaties represent asymmetrical, standard form bargains between fundamentally unequal 
parties (capital exporting states and capital importing states). Jose E. Alvarez, A BIT on 
Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 26 (2010). 
 31 On the development of customary law or general principles through this process, Mark 
Villiger takes issue with reading too much into texts.  See MARK VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A STUDY OF THEIR INTERACTIONS AND INTERRELATIONS, 
WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
(1985). In support of the proposition, see Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of 
International Law, 47 BRIT. YB. INT’L L. 1 (1974); D’Amato, supra note 29, at 896.  
 32 See also David P. Vincent, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Environmental Savior or 
Regulatory Carte Blanche?, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 45 (2014) (describing how “outside of 
large economic agreements such as the TPP, there is little hope for effective international 
environmental law, putting more pressure on the negotiators of the TPP to succeed in 
including effective environmental provisions.  Although world leaders have signed over 500 
international environmental agreements in the last fifty years, there has been little progress 
toward environmental goals.”). 
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areas.  One effect is that the U.S. Congress, with its considerable control over 
the U.S. FTA text, is effectively creating international non-trade norms. 
Transnational convergence contributes to and benefits from the 
innovation to standardization pathway.  Standardized or boilerplate language 
contributes to the development of custom.  States benefit from lower costs 
and perhaps expertise.  This view does not take into account the quality of 
the norm, however, or the ease of implementation or application of the legal 
text.  Nor does it take account of the benefits of diversity in language among 
agreements in a disparate system.  As noted above, one argument for 
bilateral and regional trade agreements is to use them as experimental 
laboratories to accomplish goals that cannot be accomplished at the WTO.33  
Advocates in favor of using agreements in this way promote experimentation 
over convergence.  What is clear is that as these agreements are applied and 
disputed, the processes that lead to recycled language may need to be 
reexamined. 
IV.  DIVERGENCE IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The prospects for the next generation of agreements point to a fascinating 
cluster of issues illustrative of larger developments in international law.  
While the present generation exhibits convergence in the development of 
new agreements, the next generation of trade agreements will be motivated 
by the application and interpretation of those agreements in the years ahead.  
This application and interpretation may lead to discursive divergence. 
The United States has been a party to a state-to-state dispute under an 
FTA other than the NAFTA just one time,34 and under the NAFTA only 
three times,35 but the increase in the number of FTAs and of FTA size is 
likely to prompt more dispute settlement in the near term.  Even with the 
consistency of language, the chance of dispute is high, particularly given that 
this generation of agreements creates multiple enforceable commitments, 
some of which can be initiated in a sense by non-state actors.  In the last 
three years, for example, the United States has received public 
                                                                                                                   
 33 See, e.g., Nadia Gire, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A Revival in United 
States Trade Policy Reform, 20 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 60 (2012) (commenting that the 
effect of concluding TPP will be to push non-Asia/Pacific countries to recognize the 
importance of completing the Doha Round of negotiations for WTO advancement). 
 34 In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) 
of the CAFTA-DR, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP. (2017), https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilater 
al-and-regional-trade-agreements/guatemala-submission-under-cafta-dr. 
 35 For details on the three cases, see Decisions and Reports, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https:// 
www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Decisions-and-Reports (last visited Mar. 
19, 2018).   
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communications advocating dispute settlement with Mexico, Honduras, 
Peru, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic over labor issues.   
At a minimum, the next generation will be characterized by what I call 
“forum proliferation”: a shift in interpretive power from treaty parties to a 
plethora of ad hoc, independent tribunals unrestricted by precedent and 
unsupervised by any superior authority.  This shift draws attention to a 
tension between states’ authority to make law and their subsequent 
delegation of law-making power.  Notwithstanding that most provisions of 
trade agreements are rule-like rather than standard-like, constraining the 
interpreter’s discretion, this generation of agreements provides little to no 
guidance on how repeated language should be interpreted and particularly 
how to interpret the interpretations that each independent tribunal develops.  
Upon receipt of those interpretations, states may choose to reexamine their 
repeated language and norms.   
One difficulty tribunals are likely to face in the interpretation of these 
agreements is a lack of guidance as to how to handle standard form language 
analyzed in the prior Part.  The customary international law rules on treaty 
interpretation provide general guidance to arbitral tribunals in their analysis 
of agreement language.  These rules as reflected in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provide that a “treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”36  Just 
as in the common law contract doctrine,37 the VCLT presumes that the text is 
the “authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and that, in 
consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the 
meaning of the text.”38   
International and domestic courts and tribunals have approached issues of 
interpretation and intent inconsistently.  This diversity has created a friction 
                                                                                                                   
 36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679.  It also directs that “there shall be taken into account, together with the context,” 
practice in the application of the agreement “which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation” as well as any relevant rules of international law. Id. 
 37 Under standard canons of contract interpretation, courts first attempt to discern the intent 
of the parties.  See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Boilerplate Versus Contract: Contract 
as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1145–46 (2006) (“[I]f actual intent is obscure, courts will 
turn to the course of dealings and course of performance between the contracting parties in an 
attempt to indirectly determine intent.  Courts will sometimes use course of dealings or course 
of performance between a set of parties to trump even explicit terms in the 
contract. . . . Importantly, the process of contract interpretation flows from evidence specific 
to the parties outward to more general and contextual sources of contract meaning.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 38 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work on the Second Part of Its Seventeenth Session and 
on Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, at 220 (1966). 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018 5:40 PM 
622  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:611 
 
 
among interpretations that go beyond the plain text to illuminate intent and 
those that seek to divine it from the text alone.  Some adjudicators have 
cautioned against going beyond the text in interpreting agreements: “The 
starting point of all treaty-interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of 
the text, not an independent investigation into the intention of the parties 
from other sources (such as by reference to the travaux préparatoires, or any 
predilections based on presumed intention).”39  This ordinary meaning-
focused approach has been adopted in many international arbitrations to 
confirm that the supposed intentions of the parties should not be used to 
override the explicit language of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), for 
example,40 or to override a textual framework,41 or be used as an independent 
basis of interpretation.42 
In certain circumstances, however, the VCLT expressly permits an 
interpreter to consult supplementary means including the preparatory work of 
the treaty “and the circumstances of its conclusion.”43  These 
“circumstances” could refer to the “negotiating context.”44  Supplementary 
means could include internal government negotiating documents, indications 
regarding the model nature of the text, or even, other agreements with the 
same text.  At a minimum, such documents may provide insight into one 
side’s intended interpretation, but it may be difficult to decipher if a certain 
view represents the parties’ shared intention.  An even greater challenge with 
a model text is the dearth of evidence with respect to one party’s intent to the 
model’s prescribed terms.  As Will Moon has observed, model texts are 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, 
Award, ¶ 78 (Dec. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Wintershall v. Argentine Republic] (“Even before the 
entry into force of the 1969 VCLT (in 1980), the Institute of International Law had adopted a 
textual approach to treaty interpretation - le texte signé est, sauf de rares exceptions, la seule 
et la plus récente expression de la volonté commune des parties.”). 
 40 Fraport v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment, ¶ 340 (Dec. 23, 2010). 
 41 Daimler Financial Services v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, 
¶ 164 (Aug. 22, 2012). 
 42 Wintershall v. Argentine Republic, supra note 39, ¶ 88; Ping An Life Insurance Company 
of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Limited v. Kingdom of 
Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29, Award, ¶ 166 (Apr. 30, 2015). 
 43 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 36, art. 32. 
 44 This position is consistent with Hersch Lauterpacht’s view that “in no circumstances 
ought preparatory work to be excluded on the ground that the treaty is clear in itself.  Nothing 
is absolutely clear in itself.”  H. Lauterpacht, Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the 
Interpretation of Treaties, 48 HARV. L. REV. 549, 571 (1935).  See generally Detlev F. Vagts, 
Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme Court, 83 
AM. J. INT’L L. 546 (1989). 
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“often devoid of distinctive terms that would limit the range of possible 
meanings that may be ascribed.”45   
The issues surrounding one-sided template agreements have long 
occupied scholars of contract law.  The fact that one party brought to the 
negotiation a standardized text calls into question whether certain potentially 
material terms were “negotiated.”  The concept of unconscionability stands 
out as one doctrine developed to address the inequities of the power 
differential underlying many form contracts.46  At common law, superior 
bargaining power alone rarely stands as a basis for interpreting a contract a 
particular way.  Disparities in power leading to imbalanced agreements that 
favor one party are permitted by courts unless the disparities produce an 
“unconscionable bargain.”47  A court may invalidate a contract or some of its 
terms where one side demonstrates the bargain to be unconscionable such as 
in a situation where one party’s freedom of contract is exploited by a 
stronger party that has control of the negotiations due to a weaker party’s 
ignorance, feebleness, unsophistication, or general naïveté.48  None of these 
conditions is a good fit for modeling trade agreement negotiations.  Even 
where a state considering boilerplate language from a proposing state finds 
limited room to maneuver to amend that language and may adopt provisions 
not necessarily out of preference, the exploitative principle underlying the 
unconscionability doctrine does not have application to the state-to-state 
trade agreement negotiations or interpretations of today.49   
Power differentials resulting from one side’s advancement of a model and 
inability to demur from the model are not an issue that international 
interpreters have taken up.  In the dispute settlement phase, trade agreement 
                                                                                                                   
 45 William J. Moon, Essential Security Interests in International Investment Agreements, 15 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 481, 489 (2012). 
 46 See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 
(1960); Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 632 
(2002). 
 47 See generally Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: 
Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 48 See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 6 (4th ed. 
1998) (“Most of contract law is premised upon a model consisting of two alert individuals, 
mindful of their self-interest, hammering out an agreement by a process of hard bargaining.”).  
As noted in a comment in the Uniform Commercial Code, “[t]he principle is one of the 
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks 
because of superior bargaining power.”  U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1998) (citation omitted).  See, e.g., Fleming Cos. v. Thriftway Medford Lakes, Inc., 
913 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.J. 1995); Piantes v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 
1995) (holding that unconscionability is not intended to address allocation of risk because of 
superior bargaining power). 
 49 At least with standardized terms in contract law, uncertainty levels should be lower, but 
that is again not the case for trade agreements as explained infra Section V.   
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018 5:40 PM 
624  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:611 
 
 
parties have equal stature toward an independent arbitral tribunal charged 
with interpreting the relevant provision of their agreement.50  The 
aforementioned customary international law rules do not provide guidance 
on the point of the power differential between the parties at the negotiation 
stage.51  Even if some terms are imported by one party without having been 
discussed with the other parties to the agreement, it is unlikely a tribunal 
would consider that fact to be part of the “context” as it is traditionally 
understood in such a way that would inform an interpretation.  U.S. courts 
also interpret treaties as contracts between two or more rational parties at 
arm’s length.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that treaties are to be 
interpreted “to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to secure 
equality and reciprocity between them.”52  Thus, the power differential that 
may have led to the appearance of certain terms in an agreement and which 
could inform the parties’ intent is not, under international law and contract 
principles, a traditional factor in interpretation of those terms. 
An adjudicator could seek guidance regarding the parties’ intent from 
documents internal to the state presenting the model.  Here, too, international 
and domestic courts and tribunals have demurred on the question of whether 
internal governmental records regarding the agreement belonging to one 
party could serve as sources of interpretation.  Most adjudicators, however, 
were not examining documents contemporaneous to the negotiations or 
preceding them.53  In thinking about how to treat U.S. internal documents 
                                                                                                                   
 50 Rachel Brewster comments that powerful states are advantaged in negotiations in a way 
they are not in dispute settlement.  See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in 
International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251, 251 (2006). 
 51 For more detail in respect of the power differential, see C. O’Neal Taylor, The U.S. 
Approach to Regionalism: Recent Past and Future, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP L. 411 (2009). 
 52 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766–68 (1985); De Geofroy v. 
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890).  The Court has not commented on the possibility that those 
two elements would be at cross purposes.  The Court’s interpretation of a treaty normally is, 
like a contract’s interpretation, a matter of determining the parties’ intent.  Air France v. Saks, 
470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) (courts must give “the specific words of the treaty a meaning 
consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties”). 
 53 Examining legislative statements at the time of implementation of the applicable 
language in Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, the investment tribunal commented:  
Whether or not explanations given by a signatory government to its own 
legislature in the course of ratification or implementation of a treaty can 
constitute part of the travaux préparatoires of the treaty for the purposes of 
its interpretation, they can certainly shed light on the purposes and 
approaches taken to the treaty, and thus can evidence opinio juris. 
Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 111 (Oct. 11, 
2002).  Another investment tribunal faced with the same question also declined to answer the 
question.  HICEE B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-11, Partial 
Award (May 23, 2011).  The tribunal in CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina 
referred to representations made to the legislature by one party’s president with regards to the 
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reflecting decision making within the Congress, John Norton Moore has 
posited that an adjudicator would need to ask whether the materials were 
available to all contracting parties, among other conditions.54  Thus, applying 
the agreements of the current generation, dispute settlement tribunals 
generally lack guidance from customary international law, the agreements 
themselves, or other model sources to understand the parties’ intent in trade 
agreements resulting from templates. 
A second interpretive challenge facing tribunals is whether the fact that 
certain language is repeated in other agreements requires tribunals to take 
account of other decisions interpreting the same language.  Some trade 
agreements include forum selection clauses to guide jurisdictional choices of 
litigants but no U.S. trade agreement provides what I will call “interpretation 
selection clauses” to guide the contours of interpretational jurisdiction for 
decision makers, particularly with respect to the appearance of the same 
terms elsewhere.  Most U.S. trade agreements neglect to address how to treat 
other trade jurisprudence at all.55  The European Union’s proposal for the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) suggested guidance 
                                                                                                                   
BIT and the meaning thereof.  CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, Objections to Jurisdiction (July 17, 2003). Likewise, in Quasar de 
Valors v. Russia, an arbitrator referred to Spanish legislative history concerning the 
ratification of the Spain-Russian Federation treaty and to a paper published by a member of 
the Russian negotiating team on the relevant language as a basis for his interpretation.  Quasar 
de Valors SICCA S.A. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Separate Opinion 
of Charles N. Brower, ¶ 18 (Mar. 20, 2009).  The Rompetrol v. Romania tribunal expressed 
doubt as to how the respondent’s treaty-making practice could be taken in itself as positive 
confirmatory evidence of an intention to give the applicable treaty a certain meaning.  
Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Objections on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, ¶ 108 (Apr. 18, 2008).  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that in the federal 
courts “it is appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence of the negotiation history” in the 
interpretation of certain congressionally approved agreements because such agreements are 
both contract and statute.  Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991).   
 54 John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution and the Rule of Law, 42 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 163, 166 (2001). 
 55 Article 1.2.2 of the TPP provides for inconsistency with existing agreements, though a 
party apparently can choose to seek to correct this problem informally or formally: 
If a Party considers that a provision of this Agreement is inconsistent with a 
provision of another agreement to which it and at least one other Party are 
party, on request, the relevant Parties to the other agreement shall consult 
with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution.  This paragraph is 
without prejudice to a Party’s rights and obligations under Chapter 28 
(Dispute Settlement). 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) art. 1.2.2, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-agr 
eements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (last visited Apr. 10, 
2018). 
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for interpreting and accommodating WTO jurisprudence.56 The CETA 
similarly directs tribunals as to how to consider WTO case law.57  The EU-
Singapore trade agreement includes some guidance but is more limited.58  
Although the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA 
(CAFTA-DR) does not provide parameters for citing other sources, in the 
United States v. Guatemala case, both sides referred to WTO jurisprudence 
and looked to the other CAFTA-DR case law for procedural guidance.59  
Even WTO-accommodating provisions can be subject to debate, however.60  
These provisions do not offer guidance with respect to the decisions of other 
FTA tribunals—guidance that may soon be needed.  Under current 
conditions, a tribunal may or may not seek to reach consistent outcomes and 
states have no way to predict how an individual tribunal will proceed in this 
respect.   
Similarly situated tribunals in the investment space have not expressly 
addressed whether to take into account interpretations of other tribunals 
confronted with the same language in other agreements.  Where such an 
interpretive issue has arisen, at least two investment tribunals have rejected 
reliance on decisions from other similar-looking treaties.61  At least two other 
                                                                                                                   
 56 EU-US TTIP Negotiations, Textual Proposal on Dispute Settlement, EUR. COMM’N 9 
(2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153032.pdf (laying out in 
Article 20, “Rules of interpretation,” that “[t]he [arbitration] panel shall also take into account 
relevant interpretations in reports of panels and the Appellate Body adopted by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body. . . .”).  
 57 CETA, supra note 17. 
 58 Messenger calls it the “multilateral elephant in the room.”  Messenger, supra note 4. 
 59 See In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 
16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, supra note 34, Written Submissions of the United States and 
Guatemala. 
 60 Simon Lester, CETA Dispute Settlement: Reference to WTO Jurisprudence, INT’L ECON. 
L. & POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 15, 2014), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2014/08/cet a-
dispute-settlement-reference-to-wto-jurisprudence.html (“How exactly should CETA panels 
‘take into account’ WTO panel and Appellate Body interpretations?  Cite to them, but feel 
free to go their own way?  Follow them as closely as possible?  What if the customary rules of 
interpretation lead the CETA panel to a different result than what the WTO panel/Appellate 
Body found?  And what happens when—don’t be shocked—WTO panel and Appellate Body 
interpretations are a bit unclear?”). 
 61 When urged to follow the view adopted by another panel, the tribunal in Nations Energy 
v. Panama noted that it had to resolve the dispute between the parties based on the clauses of 
the BIT and the facts of that case without being bound by prior decisions in cases based on 
different bilateral treaties whose provisions may be similar.  The tribunal commented that 
other tribunals have adopted a different interpretation of the relevant clause.  Nations Energy 
Inc. v. Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/19, Award, ¶ 471 (Nov. 24, 2010). In deciding 
whether to adopt an interpretation of another panel, the SGS v. Philippines tribunal found that 
“there is no good reason for allowing the first tribunal in time to resolve issues for all later 
tribunals.”  Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Jan. 29, 2004).  In two other cases, arbitrators 
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tribunals have found it appropriate to look to those decisions for guidance.62  
In the HICEE case, the claimant referred to two contemporaneous BITs and 
argued that one of the two contained the same phrase in the same position in 
the text.  For that treaty, the claimant argued that the tribunal should take into 
account explanatory notes on the treaty’s submission to the Dutch Parliament 
because, in the claimant’s view, they would be meaningful to the tribunal’s 
interpretation of the same phrase in the agreement under consideration.63  
While the tribunal did not find value in that reference, a dissenting arbitrator 
commented that “evidence of a State’s interpretation of a term in treaties 
with third States can be used as an interpretive aid.”64  
A third interpretive challenge brings us to the normative question faced 
by dispute adjudicators in the trade and investment landscape: is consistency 
in interpretation important as a principle of international decision making?  
Are divergent decisions potentially harmful?  Given the lack of rules or 
hierarchical norms, we should expect tribunals to provide mixed answers.  
Some tribunals are likely to seek to maintain consistency across agreements 
in their interpretations of identical language, while others may take no regard 
and instead adopt divergent interpretations as the natural consequence of 
their application of the VCLT or in consideration of the arguments of the 
parties.   
The arbitrators that will soon fill the ranks of the trade dispute settlement 
panels are likely to apply frameworks of thought from other areas of law, 
including commercial law, human rights law, or investment law, in which 
they work.  In the same way, investment tribunals have referred to non-
investment case law for interpretive guidance, although I have criticized this 
                                                                                                                   
made the same point: “The integrity of this interpretative process must not be compromised by 
the pronouncements of other arbitral tribunals in their interpretation of different treaties in 
wholly unrelated factual and legal contexts.  Other awards or decisions are no more than 
illustrative of the implications of a standard form of treaty wording.”  Fraport, supra note 40, 
Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Bernardo Cremades ¶ 7.5: “[G]reat caution is needed when 
identifying cases as alike, especially . . . when, moreover, the BITs often contain significant 
differences despite their similarity.”  Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and 
Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Separate 
Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, ¶ 24 (July 30, 2010). 
 62 Daimler, supra note 41, ¶ 52 (“[I]t is a fundamental principle of the rule of law that ‘like 
cases should be decided alike.’ ” (quoting Suez, supra note 61, ¶ 189)).  The tribunal in 
Quasar de Valors v. Russia noted that the it was not bound by other arbitral or international 
judicial decisions; nevertheless, it commented that the other decisions go over much of the 
same ground and it was natural to examine them in the light of the parties’ arguments in that 
case.  Quasar de Valors, supra note 53, ¶ 24. 
 63 HICEE B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2009-11, Partial Award, ¶ 143 (May 
23, 2011). 
 64 Id. Dissenting Opinion of Charles Brower, ¶ 40. 
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approach.65 Anthea Roberts additionally has observed that the dispute 
settlement stage in the investment context has involved bringing in a number 
of diverse “paradigms” or cognitive frameworks to the field, even if the 
parties to those treaties may not have intended that to be the case and even 
though this trend may have contributed to backlash toward investment 
dispute settlement more generally.66  From a private, commercial law 
perspective, diverse results are commonplace and would likely not be seen as 
troubling.  Public international lawyers, on the other hand, may find diverse 
interpretations of the same language problematic and may be inclined to seek 
consistency in interpretations. 
Proponents of public international law will find inconsistent 
interpretations troubling because inconsistency compromises the idea that 
trade law is predictable and stable and that it constitutes a legal system with 
an ordering function.67  They argue that the trade regime needs a coherent, 
uniform set of rules to create a clear expectation among governments and 
stakeholders.  Without such uniformity, those actors could be subject to 
conflicting obligations or rights.68  If arbitrators were to adopt a public 
international law perspective, seeing themselves as engaged in institution-
building, operating within a trade law regime, they may be motivated to seek 
to render consistent interpretations.69  In the words of Martti Koskenniemi, 
                                                                                                                   
 65 See generally Kathleen Claussen, The Casualty of Investor Protection in Times of 
Economic Crisis, 118 YALE L.J. 1545 (2009). 
 66 See Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment 
Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013). 
 67 See, e.g., Stephan Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of 
International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875 (2011).  Writing of the investment law 
regime, Schill observes that “[u]nlike in commercial arbitrations that are rooted in a domestic 
legal system, the international law of investment treaties appeared too uniform to justify such 
different outcomes.” Id. at 890. 
 68 See YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 114, 117 (2003); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 
 69 This view, that trade law works as a regime, is widely held.  As the number of regional 
trade agreements increases, and as dispute settlement becomes more frequent, these 
agreements begin to take the shape of massive regulatory regimes.  In the investment law 
context, commentators have likewise raised concern about “conceptual coherence” across the 
“regime” of international investment law, suggesting that divergent interpretations of similar 
language resulting from the independent tribunal framework have undermined the system’s 
legitimacy and resulted in a decreased reliability of outcomes.  Andrea K. Bjorklund & Sophie 
Nappert, Beyond Fragmentation, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 439 
(Todd Weiler & Freya Baetens eds., 2011).  See also Schill, supra note 67, at 890 (“While 
these developments were a rather natural consequence of the applicable law being enshrined 
in bilateral treaties and their interpretation and application by one-off arbitral tribunals, the 
problem of inconsistencies developed into the most important single theme in the internal 
discourse on investment law.”). Whether characterized negatively (as “fragmentation”), 
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“[t]reaty interpretation is diplomacy, and it is the business of diplomacy to 
avoid or mitigate conflict.”70  Under this view, a regime involving the same 
provisions with different dispute settlement is a zero sum game: divergent 
interpretations of the same language make agreements more difficult to 
implement because the lack of consistency makes dispute settlement 
outcomes less predictable.  The network benefit of having the same language 
is thus self-defeating.   
The resulting mix of divergence and consistency is problematic for states.  
From one perspective, the United States and its trading partners ostensibly 
intended to set up free-standing dispute settlement mechanisms through their 
diverse regional trade agreements.  In each instance, the parties should have 
the opportunity to argue the interpretation of the agreement without having to 
differentiate precedent from other agreements.  Applying interpretations 
from other tribunals in disputes between third states imposes on states that 
did not argue those cases intentions and obligations to which they did not 
subscribe or have an opportunity to debate.  At the same time, not knowing 
whether a tribunal may seek consistency or may diverge will leave states 
without any predictability in respect of its pro forma obligations. 
That a degree of homogeneity across trade agreements would exacerbate 
fragmentation in the law is in some respects counter-intuitive.71  It is non-
obvious that it would be more problematic to have panels interpreting the 
same language differently as compared to panels interpreting different 
language differently.  One counterargument is that it would be better to 
                                                                                                                   
positively (as “legal pluralism”), scientifically (as “functional differentiation”) or neutrally (as 
“specialization”), this phenomenon was once the subject of a major debate among 
international lawyers, generally.  On embracing fragmentation, see Steven Ratner, Regulatory 
Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 475 (2008).  As noted by Martti Koskenniemi in his ILC Report, “fragmentation” is 
a very frequent topic of academic writing and conferences in the last two decades.  See Martti 
Koskienniemi (Finalized Report), Report of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, n.14, UN Doc. A/CN/4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).  Some 
commentators have noted some convergence among the otherwise fragmented regime.  See, 
e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration, 12 
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 35 (2014).  Koskienniemi comments that “fragmentation and 
coherence are not aspects of the world but lie in the eye of the beholder.”  Koskienniemi, 
supra note 69, ¶ 20.  Today, some scholars have embraced the multiplicity of decisions as 
providing a “rich tapestry” of jurisprudence.  Bjorklund & Nappert, supra note 69, at 479. 
 70 Koskienniemi, supra note 69, ¶ 37.   
 71 The focus of the academy has been on how fragmentation and conflict, rather than 
consistency and uniformity, could be problematic.  On conflict, see Christopher J. Borgen, 
Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 573 (2005); PAUWELYN, supra note 
68; and Jan B. Mus, Conflicts Between Treaties in International Law, 45 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 
208 (1998).  
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operate in a zone of similarity with diverse interpretations of uniform 
commitments rather than to work with diverse interpretations of diverse 
commitments.  The experience of the investment regime suggests otherwise.  
The investment regime demonstrates the difficulties of inconsistent 
interpretations of the same language.  For example, litigants have 
successfully challenged the appointment of arbitrators in investment cases 
where those arbitrators were seen to be partial in an arbitration for not 
adopting consistent interpretations, while other commentators have found 
such challenges to be unfaithful to the basic principles of the regime—that 
every investment treaty operates in its own right.72  The courts of medieval 
England similarly developed multiple inconsistent interpretations of the same 
language, but they had the Crown to sort out those discrepancies.  
Ultimately, the question of consistency is up to the state.  A strong 
procedural argument can be made that a state should prefer arguing from 
zero than risk having to argue away bad de facto precedent.  It may be 
intellectually untidy but more reliable, nevertheless.   
Andrea Bjorklund and Sophie Nappert point out that the challenges of 
diverse outcomes may be rectified “through techniques of international 
lawyers that have been used to deal with normative conflicts in the past.”73  
These lawyers and decision makers may “cherry pick” and use other 
strategies to drive the case law that argues for a precedential system when 
convenient and against one when inconvenient to do otherwise.  Some 
tribunals may find, just as some U.S. courts have found with respect to form 
contracts in markets of sophisticated parties,74 that the market will respond to 
bad interpretations75 and on that basis they may find it appropriate to rely on 
past interpretations that have not been so addressed.76  Some panels will see 
the value in consistency and strive to be consistent either out of a feeling of 
confirmation or out of a commitment to uniform case law.  Self-referencing 
may be seen as a way to build legitimacy and confidence in the decision-
making process.  In short, the public international lawyer is likely to consider 
that the plurilateral trade law field is soon to become a conceptual mess. 
                                                                                                                   
 72 See Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. India, PCA Case No. 2013-09, Decision on Challenge, ¶ 64 
(Sept. 30, 2013) and subsequent commentary. 
 73 Bjorklund & Nappert, supra note 69. 
 74 Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at 1130 (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 
929, 947 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).   
 75 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at 1131 (“[I]f the market had had a problem with the 
prior court interpretation, the market would have corrected the language.” (citing Morgan 
Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1541–42 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983))). 
 76 This may be true despite that U.S. courts are not especially useful points of reference 
given that there is no similar market response among international trade agreements. 
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One thing is certain: to the extent states seek to remain in control of the 
meaning of their trade agreements, additional work is required to provide the 
necessary guidance to arbitrators.  It remains to be seen whether states seek 
to and are able to respond to undesirable arbitral pronouncements with a 
recalibration of their own.  In the current environment, change after dispute 
settlement may be difficult.  Unlike in dispute settlement under bilateral 
investment treaties where a loss to a state may motivate both parties to effect 
change in the interests of their respective investors, when a state loses in a 
state-to-state dispute under a trade agreement, the other side may be less 
willing to agree to a clarification.77   
V.  A WAY FORWARD: SOME TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the future is not fully predictable, the central proposition remains 
that the trade agreement regime may face both normative convergence and 
discursive fragmentation.  Two moments for improvements present 
themselves: the “front-end”—at the root of the problem where trade 
agreements are made—or at the “back-end” in the dispute settlement phase. 
On the front end, one possible solution is to update the domestic trade 
lawmaking processes to better accommodate change.  In the United States, 
for example, lawmakers could reconsider the shared power engagement to 
accommodate the political and popular realities of the twenty-first century.  
The U.S. Congress and the U.S. executive should seek to develop a 
pragmatic mechanism to replace the current system for designing U.S. trade 
law instruments with one to which both branches can contribute with a 
principled approach to standardization and innovation.  Such a process may 
go a long way to discontinuing the current path dependence in chapters that 
would benefit from customization.78  Just as scientific principles ought to be 
                                                                                                                   
 77 Even if that were not the case, change may still not be forthcoming: in a study of 
modifications made to standard contracts, Robert Scott and Mitu Gulati have found that most 
lawyers did not take efforts to revise contract language even after it was shown to be a 
litigation risk.  MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION 73–88 (2012).  The early NAFTA cases are not good touchpoints for evaluating 
whether the same will be true in the trade disputes context given that they were highly fact 
specific challenges without an emphasis on any element of the legal language that was unique 
to that agreement. 
 78 Hal Shapiro and Lael Brainard adroitly put it this way: “A more effective fast track 
would require meaningful congressional input into negotiations, more selective application of 
fast track by the president, and closer targeting of fast-track provisions to particular 
agreements.”  Lael Brainard & Hal Shapiro, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as 
Fast Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More than a Name Change, 35 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 43 (2003).  Neither I nor they were the first to make suggested 
changes to TPA.  See also Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade 
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modified to accommodate breakthroughs in science, procedural 
accommodations are needed for the new generation of trade practice.   
Recognizing the challenges to overcoming the path dependence on the 
front-end, a more realistic solution or stop-gap may present itself on the 
“back-end.”  On the back-end, or post-agreement side, the next generation of 
trade agreements would benefit from changes to the way dispute settlement 
is handled.  What is needed is some meaningful guidance for arbitral 
tribunals or a coordination mechanism.79   
One useful option may be for states to develop rules like in conflict of 
laws to govern the relationship between different systems.  Elaborating upon 
the VCLT guidance with specific instructions from states as to how trade 
should be governed would improve outcomes for states and allow them to 
maintain control over their public commitments.  In the absence of formal 
rules, arbitrators could be encouraged by states in the course of litigation to 
apply a variation of relational contract theory in their interpretations to better 
accommodate ongoing relationships between disputing states and the 
existence of a larger regime.  Relational contract theory posits two broad 
categories of contracts: discrete contracts and intertwined contracts.  Discrete 
contracts are short-term contracts requiring “a minimum of future 
cooperation between the parties . . . . Everything is clearly defined and 
presentiated.”80  By comparison, intertwined contracts are intended for long-
term relationships between the parties and a larger regime.  They include 
broader terms in need of regular interpretation.  “Intertwined contracts view 
the bargain as complex and dynamic, and as part of an interdependency 
whose meaning may be influenced by context.”81  In an intertwined contract, 
the contracting parties view the “relation as an ongoing integration of 
behavior which will grow and vary with events in a largely unforeseeable 
future.”82  Nearly any inter-state agreement or contract will be necessarily 
                                                                                                                   
Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 143 (1992); Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Track for 
International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. INT’L L.J. 471 (1990). 
 79 See generally Messenger, supra note 4 (noting the chances that parties will use these 
other fora instead of the WTO to resolve their disputes: “One wonders whether either side 
would be comfortable with panels within the TTIP or CETA taking the lead from WTO 
reports that arose from other disputes . . . .”). 
 80 Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors 
Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 276 (1987). 
 81 Mark Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental Law, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 843, 944 (2002). 
 82 Id. at 945.  See also William J. Aceves, The Economic Analyis of International Law, 17 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 995, 1013–14.  Relational contract theory views the contractual 
relationship as dynamic, in contrast to classical contract law which views it as static. 
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intertwined.83 
Among this generation of trade agreements the relational elements extend 
beyond the individual parties to a single agreement and arguably reach other 
trading partners with agreements with similar terms in the larger regime the 
generation has created.  C.J. Mahoney offers that the project of relational 
contract theorists has been “to construct distinct rules of interpretation that 
are best suited to effectuate the intent of the parties in relational situations.”84 
This approach would shift the focus from the traditional sources set out in the 
VCLT to take into account the relationship between the parties and 
potentially among similar agreements.  Such a strategy could lessen pressure 
on the negotiating language travaux to look to the future, though it could 
make the interpretation process still more complex. 
A second option would be to renegotiate existing agreements with clauses 
that accommodate divergence or consistency and to ensure that future 
agreements likewise provide guidance on what to make of decisions rendered 
under other agreements.  The New Zealand-Brunei Side Agreement to the 
TPP is the only agreement of which I am aware that expressly provides for 
how arbitrators should treat other decisions (saying other agreements with 
the same language should be interpreted consistently).  Apart from that, 
commentators have questioned what the TPP means for the NAFTA and pre-
existing FTAs among the parties, for example, more generally. 
Transparent travaux and guidance on the interrelationship between and 
among agreements will be critical.  An improved regime would involve a 
singular dispute mechanism or guidance as to how to manage divergent 
interpretations.  An even better regime would accommodate customized 
provisions such that dispute settlement tribunals would employ customary 
rules of interpretation without seeking to accommodate different readings of 
the text.  Having recognized such problems in the investment context, states 
have taken steps to rein in tribunals.  As Roberts puts it, the United States has 
“draft[ed] a new breed of investment treaties in which [it and other states] 
spell out the extent and limits of their treaty obligations with greater 
specificity.”85  Parties should provide interpretative guidance to fill the gaps 
                                                                                                                   
 83 Ethan Leib has usefully analyzed the theoretical underpinning of relational contract 
theory in the context of consumer form contracts with lessons to be considered for the 
application of relational analysis should it be applied to standard form provisions in trade 
agreements.  See Ethan Leib, What is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form Contract?, in 
REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND 
THE LYRICAL 259 (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell & William Whitford eds., 2013). 
 84 Craig Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the 
Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 874 (2007). 
 85  Roberts, supra note 66, at 79. 
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or update the VCLT in this respect.  Given the diversity of practice on the 
question of whether to consider internal government documents or similar 
information that would reflect the thinking and intent behind select language, 
to the extent courts and tribunals engage in this practice, they will face 
difficulty in seeking to do so for standardized agreement language that they 
find to be ambiguous.  Interpretations that draw from relational contract 
theory, taking into account the larger relationship among the parties and the 
regime in which the agreement is situated, could be an additional advantage 
to navigating the nascent regime. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this adolescent regional trade law regime, the structural features of 
negotiations and the substance of the resulting agreement are necessarily 
intertwined.  At least in the United States, this dynamic is necessarily 
different from other types of international law-making.  TPP is emblematic 
of the way in which a process designed to prevent failure has only 
exacerbated structural difficulties to the point of paralysis.   
Dispute settlement may cause the United States and others to revisit the 
copy-paste approach, however.  Now is the time to re-consider the values 
that motivate how we make our international trade agreements.  
 
